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Hedge Fund Regulation: What the FSA
Is Doing Right and Why the SEC
Should Follow the FSA's Lead

Lartease Tiffith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent news about hedge funds' successes' and failures, and in some
cases outright fraud,2 has increased the public's interest in a field that often
prefers to cloak itself in a hidden veil. One can analogize hedge fund
* J.D.-M.B.A. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University. I wish to thank Professor
David Ruder for his invaluable advice and feedback on this and previous drafts. I also wish
to thank my family and friends for their continued support and Professor Peter Swenson for
being an excellent mentor over the years. Last but not least, I wish to thank the staff of the
journal for their excellent editorial help. Without their help, this comment would not be
possible. The errors are attributable solely to me.
1 See Sandra Guy, Lampert Leapfrogs to Top Income in Hedge Funds, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
May 30, 2005, at 53 (reporting that Edward Lampert, "the [hedge fund] manager who
engineered Kmart's takeover of Sears, Roebuck and Co. won't be needing any blue-light
specials" because he was the best paid hedge fund manager in 2004 with his reported salary
of $1.02 billion); Jenny Anderson & Riva D. Atlas, Is This the New Emerald City, or the
Road to the Next Crash?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at Cl (reporting the recent successes
of hedge funds).
2 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Hedge Fund Falls Off the Face of the Earth, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2005, at Cl (reporting the recent announcement by federal and state regulators that
regulators were investigating in the Bayou Group, a $400 million hedge fund accused of
investor fraud); David Sedore, Hedge Funds Assets Frozen, PALM BEACH POST (Florida),
Mar. 4, 2005, at 1D (reporting the freezing of assets belonging to KL Group, an $81 million
hedge fund with 250 investors, after SEC investigators alleged that the principals of KL
Group had defrauded their investors of more than $70 million); Justin Hibbard & Adrienne
Carter, Another Fishy Hedge Fund; a Mysterious Money Manager,Nonstop Hype, Plunging
Returns, Empty Offices, and Now an SEC Probe-TheIntrigue at Wood River Deepens, Bus.
WK., Oct. 24, 2005, at 36 (reporting the SEC launch of an investigation into Wood River
Capital Management, a multi-million dollar hedge fund); Ian McDonald & Valerie
Bauerlein, NFL Players Sue A Hedge Fundfor Fraud,Theft, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2006, at
B 1 (reporting the lawsuit filed by current and former NFL players such as Terrell Davis and
Steve Atwater against International Management Associates LLC, claiming that the hedge
fund had failed to return more than $15 million the players had invested in the hedge fund).
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managers and the hedge fund industry to the nostalgic era of cowboys and
the wild frontier. Hedge fund managers, like cowboys of the old days, do
not want to be regulated. Just as the cowboys entering the frontier
appreciated the lack of law or authority over their actions, today's hedge
fund managers appreciate the lack of law or authority over their actions.
And just as the frontier's significance to our nation grew requiring sheriffs
and marshals to protect the new settlers from the wild cowboys, investors
and the financial markets require protection from these modem day
cowboys. Of course, just as the cowboys tried to fight the imposition of
law and authority by arguing that they did not need policing because they
are able to police themselves, hedge fund managers have advocated that
regulation is unnecessary because they are able to self-police. In our
modem frontier, while some hedge funds undoubtedly have helped make
our financial markets more efficient, other hedge funds may have hurt
investors and the financial markets through investor fraud, market
manipulation, and additional market failure risk. The negative effects of
hedge funds have persisted largely because hedge funds have remained
lightly regulated. Investors and the financial markets need and desire some
protection. More importantly, the recent rapid growth in the size and scope
of hedge funds has made them the biggest players in the global financial
markets. As a result of this rapid growth, unregulated hedge fund activity
poses an ever-increasing threat to the very stability of the global financial
markets.
This comment is organized into five sections. In Section II, I discuss
what hedge funds are and why the public should care about them. In
Section III, I discuss how the near collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management ("LTCM") was the first major indication to the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and United Kingdom's Financial
Services Authority ("FSA") that some type of regulation of hedge funds
was needed. In Section IV, I provide an overview of the SEC's current and
past stances on regulating hedge funds. In Section V, I discuss what the
FSA has done and is proposing to do and why the SEC should follow its
lead. In sum, I conclude that while the SEC has focused on preventing
investor fraud and requiring hedge fund disclosure of certain operational
and financial data to investors, the FSA has focused on more important
concerns: market risk, liquidity risk, capital requirements, and excessive
economic leverage.
II. HEDGE FUNDS: WHAT ARE THEY AND WHY SHOULD WE
CARE?
A. Definition of a Hedge Fund
Despite all of the recent attention paid by both the SEC and FSA to the
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hedge fund industry, neither regulator has attempted to provide a legal or
statutory definition of a hedge fund. Instead, hedge funds are usually
defined by several characteristics rather than by any particular legal
structure. Of the lists of characteristics provided by the two regulators, the
FSA's list is the more comprehensive. The FSA characterizes hedge funds
by their investment management techniques and by their common
structures. 3 Typical investment management techniques used include short
selling,4 derivatives, 5 and economic leverage. 6 Common structures include:
[Pursuing] absolute returns, rather than measuring their investment
performance relative to a benchmark; charging performance-based
fees in addition to a management fee; having broader mandates than
traditional funds which give [hedge fund] managers more flexibility
to shift strategy; high trading volumes/fund turnover; [and]
frequently setting a very high minimum investment limit (e.g. US
$100,000 or higher for most funds).7

On the other hand, the SEC lists three characteristics that are typical of
a hedge fund: (1) "an entity that holds a pool of securities" or other assets
that "does not register its securities offerings under the Securities Act and
which is not registered as an investment company under the Investment
Company Act;" (2) a "fee structure, which compensates the adviser based
upon a percentage of the hedge fund's capital gains and capital
3 FINANCIAL

REGULATORY

SERVICES

AUTHORITY,

ENGAGEMENT

10-11
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FUNDS:

(June 2005),

A

DISCUSSION

OF

RISK

AND

available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/

pubs/discussion/dp05_04.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 2005 DP].
4 According to Gordon De Brouwer,
Short-selling is the sale of an asset, such as a bond, stock or another asset that the
[investor] does not own. The [investor] first borrows the bond, stock or other asset
from another party [the lender], with the promise of repaying it back at some
future time, and then [the investor] sells it. If the price of the stock, bond or other
asset has fallen by the time the [investor] is due to repay it to the lender then he
can buy it back in the market for less than he initially sold it. The profit is the
selling price less the buying price and the cost of borrowing the asset.
9 (2002).
5 A derivative is a financial instrument, traded on or off an exchange, the price of which
is directly dependent upon the value of one or more underlying securities, equity indices,
debt instruments, commodities, other derivative instruments, or any agreed upon pricing
index or arrangement. Derivatives involve the trading of rights or obligations based on the
underlying product but do not directly transfer property. They are used to hedge risk or to
exchange a floating rate of return for a fixed rate of return. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's Glossary Online, http://www.cftc.gov/opa/glossary/opaglossary-d.htm (last
visited Dec. 23, 2006).
6 2005 DP, supra note 3, at 10.
7
1d.
GORDON DE BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS
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amounts
appreciation;" and (3) the fund managers "often invest significant
8
of their own money into the hedge funds that they manage."
B. Organization of Hedge Funds
Hedge funds are usually organized into limited liability corporations or
limited partnerships. 9 Hedge funds acquire investors through private
placements.' 0 The minimum investment required varies among hedge
funds, with minimum amounts as low as $100,000 for some hedge funds
and as high as $5,000,000 for other funds." The investors are usually
locked-in to the fund for a short period of time, usually less than one year,
and must provide advance notice to the hedge fund when seeking to
withdraw their money. 12 Hedge funds' managers charge management and
performance incentives fees, typically two percent and twenty percent,
respectively.' 3 Most hedge funds are incorporated offshore, in4exotic places
such as Grand Cayman and Bermuda, to minimize taxes paid.'
C. Hedge Funds Investment Strategies
Hedge funds use several different investment strategies. Generally,
there are two broad types of investment strategies: macro investment
strategy 15 and arbitrage investment strategy. 16 Some of the financial
8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS

viii (2003),

available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf

[hereinafter SEC REPORT]. By virtue of its adoption of Rules 203(b)(3)-2 and 203(b)(3)- 1,
the SEC has all but eliminated this characteristic.
9 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE
FUNDS, LEVERAGE AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1, (Apr. 1999),

[hereinafter
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf)
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT].
10 See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ix. For a brief explanation of private placement in
relation to hedge funds please see Section IV.A, infra (discussing the private offering
exemption).
11 SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at x.
12See DE BROUWER, supra note 4, at 11.
13 id.
14Id. at 12. According to the SEC Report, in addition to minimizing taxes there may be
other reasons why hedge funds are organized in foreign jurisdictions. SEC REPORT, supra
note 8, at ix.
15Hedge funds use a macro investment strategy to assess endogenous factors, such as a
country's financial markets, macroeconomy, and political process, and exogenous factors,
such as other countries' economic indicators, to determine whether there is a "fundamental
imbalance" which would likely "result in substantial movement" in that country's "financial
asset prices" such as its exchange rate, stock prices, bond yields, and short-term interest
rates. DE BROUWER, supranote 4, at 21.
16Hedge funds use arbitrage investment strategy to take advantage of discrepancies in the
price of two financial instruments. Id.
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instruments used in both macro investment and arbitrage strategies include
spots, 17 forwards,1 8 swaps,' 9 futures, 20 and complex derivatives 2 1 or
options.22
D. The Use and Importance of Economic Leverage
Hedge funds typically make use of economic leverage.23 Hedge funds
can acquire assets, such as securities, either by using their own capital,
usually that of their limited and general partners or by using borrowed
funds, from entities such as banks. When hedge funds use debt to acquire
assets, this is called leveraging.2 4 For example, a typical hedge fund is able
to borrow $2 for every $1 that it has in its capital reserves. Thus, a hedge
fund with a typical size of $1 billion is able to borrow at least $2 billion
from creditors. LTCM, discussed in depth infra in Section III.A, was able
to borrow $125 billion from creditors based on the reputation of its
principals and its capital reserve of $5 billion, creating a whopping debt-toequity ratio of 25 to 1.26
There are two types of leverage in the hedge fund context: on-balance
sheet and off-balance sheet. Assets, capital, and debt are balance sheet
17 A spot or spot price of an asset is the price for intermediate delivery of that asset. See
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 730 (McGraw-Hill Irwin 2006) (1981) [hereinafter BREALEY MYERS].

18A forward is a contract where one party promises to pay for a certain asset, commodity
or cash in the future for a specific price and the other party commits to sell the asset at a
specific price. Id. at 727-34.
19In a swap, an investor swaps risk extending from an underlying asset. For example in a
default swap, one party will promise to pay a fixed sum each year to another party as long as
a certain company does not default on its debts. If the company does default, then the party
who received the fixed payment will then compensate the first party, but if the company
never defaults then the original party never receives anything. This is analogous to the
second party providing the first party with long-term insurance against default in return for
an annual insurance premium. Id. at 735.
20Unlike a forward contract, a future contract is standardized and traded on an exchange.
According to Brealey Myers, "When you buy or sell a futures contract, the price is fixed
today but payment is not made until later. You will, however, be asked to put up a margin in
the form of either cash or Treasury bills to demonstrate that you have the money to honor
your side of the bargain. Id. at 729.
21A derivative is an "asset whose value derives from that of some other assets (e.g., a
future or an option). Id. at 995.
22Generally, there are two kinds of options: a call option where the owner has the option
to buy an asset at a specified exercise price on or before a specified exercise date and a put
option where a seller has the option to sell an asset at a specified exercise price on or before
a specified exercise date. See id. at 993, 1002.
23See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 4-5.
24See DE BROUWER, supra note 4, at 10.
25 See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at Al.
26 Id. at 12.
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items, so hedge funds typically report them on the balance sheet. However,
when hedge funds make use of short positions, repurchase agreements, and
derivatives contracts, they typically do not report these on the balance sheet.
This is justified in the case of shorted stock sales because there are no
assets. The underlying asset is bought and then sold and therefore no
"liability" attached to that borrowing is on the balance sheet although in
actuality there is a liability. 27 This accounting treatment is justified because
the liability is contingent, meaning that it is a future liability and not a
current liability. 28 Most hedge funds have little to no on-balance sheet
leverage but do have a large amount of economic leverage associated with
these off-balance sheet positions. 29 Hedge funds often prefer to use offbalance sheet leverage because this enables them to boost their positions or
exposures in financial markets.30 Why invest only $1 billion of your own
capital if you could also invest $5 billion of someone else's capital as well
for little additional cost?
Hedge funds are able to get favorable lending terms from creditors
based on their track record and collateral. 31 For a small hedge fund with no
credit history with a bank, the collateral required could be for the full
amount of the loan. In a situation such as this, the hedge fund would only be
able to use its own capital to establish a market position, and therefore
could not leverage its own capital.32 For a hedge fund with an established
history and reputation, the loan funds would be provided at a margin, with
the percentage of required collateral ranging anywhere from a few
percentages up to twenty percent of the borrowed amount.33 In this
situation, the hedge fund would be able to leverage its own capital. The
amount of leverage would depend on its margin requirement. A small
margin requirement would allow its leverage to be substantial. Banks
34
require margins typically to enable them to cover daily mark-to-market
exposures associated with a hedge fund's position.35 No collateral is
required for a large hedge fund, such as a macro-focused hedge fund; thus,
a large hedge fund can establish market position without using any of its
own capital, allowing the hedge fund's capital to be substantially
27 DE BROUWER, supra note 4, at 10.
28
29

Id.
Id.

30 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note

9, at 4.

31 DE BROUWER, supra note 4, at 25.
32 id.
33 id.

34 According to the President's Working Group Report, mark-to-market practice is "the
discipline of periodically valuing positions at current market prices... this discipline is
useful for preventing the concealment of losses and for encouraging the timely resolution of
problems." PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
35 Id.
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leveraged. 36 The large hedge fund's market positions would
not be
37
subjected to margin requirements unless they move into a loss.
Only a few restraints exist on the amount of economic leverage a
hedge fund may obtain. They are (1) the willingness of financial
intermediaries, such as banks, to provide the credit that finances the offbalance sheet transactions; (2) the cost of leveraging to the hedge fund; and
(3) the hedge fund's risk tolerance.3 8
Currently, no source of
comprehensive data on hedge funds' economic leverage exists; regulators in
the United States and United Kingdom need to address this void.
E. The Benefits of Economic Leverage
Hedge funds, including their use of economic leverage, provide some
very valuable benefits to the financial markets by making the financial
markets more efficient. First, hedge funds, through their continual trading,
provide liquidity to the markets. 39 According to Gordon De Brouwer,
"liquidity in markets refers to the willingness of participants to enter the
market and buy or sell. The more buyers and sellers willing to enter the
market, the more liquid it is." 40 Liquidity is beneficial because it means that
a given asset can be easily traded without causing a significant change in
the asset's price. Next, hedge funds, through their constant search for
mispricings of financial assets, reduce "the mispricing of financial assets
that might occur across markets. 4 1 Hedge funds, in an effort to make a
quick profit, seek out opportunities such as mispricings of financial assets
across financial markets. The more hedge funds and hedge fund dollars
seeking these opportunities, the less likely it is that a mispricing would exist
for very long before the mispricing is corrected. Together these aspects of
hedge fund activity help to make financial markets more efficient.42
F. The Disadvantages of Economic Leverage
In addition to providing these benefits, hedge funds substantially
increase the risk of a systemic global financial meltdown, similar to what
might have occurred had LTCM's collapse not been avoided by a lastminute bailout by its creditors.
36

Id.

37 Id.
38 Id. at
39

10.

Id. at 2.

40 DE BROUWER, supra note 4, at 22.
41

Roger Ferguson, Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Speech To the Banco de

Mexico International Conference, U.S Fed. News (Nov. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/Speeches/2005/200511152/default.htm
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2007).
42 Id.
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Although increases in economic leverage help to reduce market risk,
increases in leverage also increase funding risk, which in turn increases
liquidity risk.43

In general, an increase in leverage increases market risk;

however, in the case where the portfolio is actively managed, increased
leverage will actually lead to lower levels of market risk. 4 Financial
intermediaries frequently "manage the market risks thews assume from their
customers by taking offsetting market risk positions."
According to the
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, "[1]everage introduces thirdparty liabilities ... which introduce funding risk.... [T]he satisfaction of
such liabilities and conditions thereon may require early liquidation of
positions comprising the portfolio, thereby introducing asset liquidity risk"
to the hedge fund's portfolio. 46 When a counterparty 47 increases its margin
or collateral requirements, a hedge fund that lacks capital reserves must
raise the needed funds either through investors or by liquidating its current
portfolios to meet the margin or collateral requirements. In the case where
a hedge fund is experiencing losses, having to liquidate its current portfolio
might exacerbate its losses, which could lead to additional margin or
collateral calls, which would of course lead to additional losses. Thus, the
risk of having inadequate capital reserves could substantially amplify any
losses suffered by the hedge funds. If hedge funds experience unanticipated
shocks, which do tend to occur, which they are not capable of withstanding,
a tidal wave of losses in the financial markets and a reduction in investor
confidence could result. What happened during LTCM's near collapse is a
perfect example of this type of problem.
With the rapid increase in the size and activity of hedge funds, and
with that a substantial increase in hedge funds' influence on the global
financial markets, the risk of a systemic meltdown of the global financial
markets has increased substantially. According to the SEC, hedge funds
have grown tremendously in size over the last five years.4 8 Over the last
five years total assets under management by hedge funds have grown 260
percent.49 In 2004 alone, hedge fund managed assets grew thirty percent.50
43

See

RISK

COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, IMPROVING COUNTERPARTY
MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES
at
17-18,
(June
1999),

http://www.defaultrisk.com/pp-other_08.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007)
CRMPG Report].
44 Id. at 17.
45

Id.

46

Id. at 18.

[hereinafter

47 In the finance industry, parties to a contract are often referred to as counterparties.

48 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of CertainHedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054, 72056 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
SEC Final Rule].
49 id.
50 Id.
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Today, hedge funds manage an estimated $1.1 trillion in assets. 5 1 More
astonishing is what that amount means to the global financial markets. One
commentator believes that $1 trillion dollars in assets held and used by
hedge funds has the equivalent affect of $22 trillion because of leveraging
and asset turnover.5 2 A CS First Boston study estimated that hedge funds
account for as much as fifty percent of trading done on the stock
exchanges. 3 The hedge fund industry is a colossal beast and poses
significant danger to the global financial markets if left unchecked.
III. THE NEAR COLLAPSE OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT: THE FIRST MAJOR SIGN OF TROUBLE AND
NEED FOR REGULATION
A. LTCM's Near Collapse
In 1993, John Meriwether, a former vice-chairman of the prestigious
finance firm Salomon Brothers, set out to create the greatest hedge fund
ever. 54 Meriwether had assembled some of the greatest financial markets
theorists and bond traders to join him. 55 One of the notables included
Myron Scholes, a finance and economics professor at Stanford University,
who was famous for co-inventing a formula to value options that Wall
Street refers to as the Black-Scholes model, 56 and who would go on later to
share a Nobel Prize in Economics. Another notable was Robert Merton, an
economist at Harvard University famous for improving on the BlackScholes model,5 7 who would go on later to share in the Nobel Prize with
Scholes and Fischer Black. Additionally, Meriwether was able to convince
David W. Mullins, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve under Alan
Greenspan, to join his hedge fund. The hedge fund was named Long-Term
Capital Management to signify the group's desire to have investors commit
long-term to the fund to enable it to withstand short-term changes in the
market without having to go back into the market for more capital.58 The

51 Hunt Taylor, The Prudent Man vs. the SophisticatedInvestor, Round II, HEDGEWORLD
DAILY NEWS May 11, 2005.

52 Hunt Taylor, The Sophisticated Investor, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2005.
53 2005 DP, supra note 3, at 14.
54 Leah Nathans Spiro, John Meriwether's Brain Trust Made Billions at Salomon. Can
They Do It On Their Own?, Bus. WK, Aug. 29, 1994, at 50.
55 Id.
56See The Nobel Prizefor Economics. The Right Option, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 1997,

at 75 (explaining the significance of Merton's, Scholes', and Black's work).
57 See Nobel Economists' Bittersweet News Late PartnerCitedfor Theory, USA TODAY,
Oct. 15, 1997, at 7B.
58 ROGER LOWENSTEIN,

WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 27-28 (2000).
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hedge fund raised an initial $1.25 billion from private and public foreign
banks,5 9 wealthy businessmen such as celebrity agent Michael Ovitz and
Phil Knight, CEO of Nike, and pension funds such as the Black & Decker
Corporation's pension fund. 60 The hedge fund's management team
contributed $125 million of its own money into the fund.6'
LTCM's investment strategy was to exploit discrepancies in market
pricing-a strategy that allowed LTCM to focus on making money over
long periods of time and thus fit LTCM's goal of having a long-term
investor lock up period so LTCM could withstand short-term market
fluctuations.
According to Andre Perold: "LTCM generally sought to
hedge the risk-exposure components of its positions that were not expected
to add incremental value to portfolio performance and to increase the valueadded component of its risk exposures by borrowing to increase the size of
its positions. 6 3
In the beginning, LTCM was extremely successful, so successful that
it was able to raise an additional $2 billion from investors. 64 At its peak,
LTCM held $6.7 billion in capital.6 5 In 1997, LTCM decided to return $2.7
billion of capital to outside investors after determining that it needed to
bring the capital base of the fund in line with its risk and liquidity needs.66
However, in August of 1998, LTCM suffered some of its worst losses,
losing $550 million in one day. Subsequent to these events, LTCM's
leverage climbed from a debt-to-equity ratio of 19:1 to 42:1.67 In the month
of August alone, LTCM lost $1.8 billion in equity, bringing it down to $2.3
billion in capital.68
LTCM's problems started when Russia declared that it would devalue
the ruble and place a 90-day moratorium on repaying most of its foreign
debt. 69 As a result, investors rushed to investments that offered lower risk
and provided liquidity. According to the Treasury Department's report on
Hedge Funds, Leverage, and Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management:

59Id. at 38.
60

id.

id.
Andre F. Perold, Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. (A), (Harvard Bus. School
Publ'g 1999).
63 Id.
61
62

64

id.

65 id.

66 Andre F. Perold, Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. (C), (Harvard Bus. School
Publ'g 1999).
67 Id. at 3.
68 Id.
69 Thomas Walkom, Tumbling Ruble isNo Penny-Ante Crisis Russian Woes Could Lead

to Collapse of World's Economy, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 23, 1998, at FI.
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Russia's actions sparked a 'flight to quality' in which investors
avoided risk and sought out liquidity. As a result, risk spreads and
liquidity premiums rose sharply in markets around the world. The
size, persistence, and pervasiveness of the widening of risk spreads
confounded the risk management models employed by LTCM and
other participants. Both LTCM and other market participants
suffered losses in individual markets that greatly exceeded what
conventional risk models, estimated during more stable periods,
suggested were probable. Moreover, the simultaneous shocks to
many markets confounded expectations of relatively low correlations
between market prices and revealed that global trading portfolios like
LTCM's were less well diversified than assumed. Finally, the 'flight
to quality' resulted in a substantial reduction in the liquidity of many
markets, which, contrary to the assumptions implicit in their models,
made it difficult to reduce exposures quickly without incurring
further losses.7 °
As the world braced for what might have been a worldwide systematic
meltdown of financial markets, creditors such as those who supplied credit
to LTCM began to tighten credit requirements, making it likely that LTCM
would be forced to exit some of its positions at substantial losses.7 1 Roger
Lowenstein, in his book When Genius Failed. The Rise & Fall of LongTerm CapitalManagement, perfectly described LTCM's position:
In such a climate, there was no way [LTCM] could get out of its
humongous trades without moving the markets even more. The
partners had assumed that other arbitrageurs would recognize the
values that they saw; their failure to step forward mystified them.
Now, like generals who overcommit to a distant war, they found the
road out blocked.72
Finally, faced with the possibility that LTCM would default on its
loans, and thus cause many of them substantial losses, LTCM's
counterparties began to look for an alternative solution to a default. A
consortium of the most affected counterparties, aided by the Federal
Reserve Bank, entered into a consortium to inject $3.6 billion in new equity
in LTCM's portfolio in exchange for a ninety percent stake in the portfolio
plus operational control.73 As a result, LTCM's investors and management
team were left 7with
only ten percent equity in the fund, thus sustaining a
4
substantial lOSS.

70 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT,

supra note 9, at 12.

7' See id. at 12-13.

72 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 148.
73 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
74 Id.

9, at 14.
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B. Important Lessons Learned
There were several important lessons to be learned from the LTCM
disaster. First, LTCM provided regulators and market participants with a
first-hand look at the effect substantial leverage can have on a hedge fund's
ability to restructure its positions in the market. LTCM's high leverage and
lack of readily available capital caused it to suffer more losses than it would
have had it been more appropriately leveraged and held adequate capital
reserves.
Second, LTCM's near collapse demonstrated that international
financial markets are becoming more interdependent, so that events in
Russia, Japan, or Mexico can have enormous effects on financial markets in
the United States or United Kingdom.
Third, LTCM highlighted the possible effect that one participant in the
global financial markets can have on the entire system. LTCM's near
failure threatened not only its investors and principals but also the many
counterparties who had loaned substantial sums to LTCM. If LTCM had
collapsed completely, its counterparties would have suffered substantial
losses and the global financial markets could have experienced greater
disruption. LTCM illustrates the enormous effect a hedge fund's leverage
can have on the financial markets including many of its counterparties.
More importantly, it illustrates the potential for excessive leverage to cause
a devastating multiplying effect on the global financial markets.
C. LTCM's Near Collapse was the First Indication of the Need for Greater
Regulatory Supervision over Hedge Funds.
LTCM's near collapse was the first indication of the need for greater
regulatory supervision over hedge funds. Up to this point, the SEC merely
has addressed the consumer fraud problems through disclosure and
registration requirements. The SEC, like the FSA, needs to go beyond
disclosure and registration requirements to include capital requirements,
limits on leverage, and active monitoring. Both regulators and LTCM's
counterparties failed to monitor LTCM sufficiently. According to the
President's Working Group Report:
This insufficient monitoring arose, in part, because of LTCM's
practice of disclosing only minimal information to these parties,
information such as balance sheet and income statements that did not
reveal meaningful details about the Fund's risk profile and
concentration of exposures in certain markets. In LTCM's case, this
minimal level of disclosure was tolerated because of the stature of its
principals, its impressive track record, and the opportunity for the
Fund's investors and counterparties to profit from a significant
relationship with LTCM. LTCM's willingness to bear risk also
made it an attractive counterparty for those firms seeking to hedge
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their own exposures. Thus, the main limitation on the LTCM Fund's
overall scale
75 and leverage was that provided by its managers and
principals.
For highly leveraged hedge funds, regulatory restraints, such as capital
requirements, could serve to constrain more effectively the degree of their
leverage and the probability of a failure with systemic implications. A
possible negative impact of increased regulation is that it would likely drive
more hedge6 funds offshore, which would decrease the effectiveness of
regulation.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINAL SEC RULE REGULATING
HEDGE FUNDS
A. Preliminary Background on Four Important U.S. Laws
Four U.S. laws principally concern hedge funds operating in the
United States: the Securities Act of 1933, 77 the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,78 the Investment Company Act of 1940, 79 and the Investors Advisers
Act of 1940.80
1. Securities Act of 1933

Generally, the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") requires full
and fair disclosure in securities transactions. 1 The Securities Act requires
that securities for public offering be registered with the SEC and that
purchasers of such securities receive a prospectus containing particular
categories of information about the offering and the issuer such as "a profit
and loss statement for not more than three preceding fiscal years" and "a
statement of the capitalization of the issuer," unless the offering satisfies an
exemption from the registration requirements.8 2
Hedge funds, which often offer interests in a limited partnership,
limited liability corporate partnership, or other legal entity, fall within the
Securities Act's definition of securities and thus must register their offer
and sale of these securities, unless they rely on an available exemption from
" Id. at 15.
76

According to sources such as International Financial Services and the government of

the Cayman Islands, 43% to 80% of hedge funds are located offshore. See On New Ground,
LEGAL WK., Nov. 10, 2005.
77 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).

78 Id. §§ 78a-78nn (1994).
7 Id. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1994).
80 Id. §§ 80b-l-80b-21 (1994).
81 Id. §§ 77a-77aa.
82 Id. §§ 77e, 77aa.
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registration. 83 Hedge funds rely on the private offering exemption in
section 4(2) of the Securities Act, or Rule 506 promulgated under that
section, to avoid the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of
Section 5.84 Section 4(2) exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving a
public offering." 85 The private offering exemption is available only to
issuers, so it does not exempt sales to any person who wishes to resell the
securities nor does it exempt sales by any affiliates of the issuer. This
uncertainty leads most hedge funds to tailor their security offerings to meet
the criteria in Rule 506.86 According to Rule 506, offers and sales of hedge
fund securities cannot be made using any form of "general solicitation or
general advertising." 87 This means that hedge fund issuers and those acting
on their behalf cannot solicit potential investors through media such as
newspaper advertisements or articles, nor can issuers solicit investors
through seminars to which the investors have been invited by general
solicitation or advertising.
Thus, Rule 506 requires that hedge funds must exercise reasonable
care to insure that their investors are not investing with the goal of later
distributing their interests in the hedge fund to the public. 88 As long as
hedge funds make a reasonable inquiry, they can continue to take advantage
of this safe harbor even if investors later sell their interests to the public.
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") requires
dealers in securities to register with the SEC.8 9 Section 3(a)(5) defines a
dealer as "any person engaged in the business of buying and sellin9
securities for such person's own account through a broker or otherwise.
The Exchange Act contains registration and reporting provisions that may
apply to hedge funds. Section 12 of the Exchange Act, and the rules
promulgated thereunder, govern the registration of classes of equity
securities that are (1) traded on an exchange, or (2) meet the holder of
record and asset tests of Section 12(g) and related rules. 91 Section 12(g)
requires that an issuer having 500 holders of record of a class of equity
security (other than an exempted security) and assets in excess of $1 million
at the end of its most recently ended fiscal year register the equity security
83 Id. § 77d.

84 Id. § 77d(2).
85
86
87
8

id.

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506, 502(c).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506, 502.
89 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (1994).
90 Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
9' Id. § 781(a)-(/).
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under the Exchange Act, unless the issuance meets one of the exemptions.9 2
Domestic registrants of a class of equity securities are then subjected to the
periodic reporting requirements of Section 13,9 proxy requirements of
Section 14, and insider reporting and short swing profit provisions of
Section 16 of the Exchange Act.95 Although hedge fund interests fall
within the definition of equity security under the Exchange Act, most hedge
funds seek to avoid Exchange Act registration by having fewer than 500
holders of record (which in the case of hedge funds are also generally the
investors).
Under the beneficial ownership rules in Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the
Exchange Act, any person who, after acquiring beneficial ownership of any
equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act,
beneficially owns greater than five percent of the class of equity securities,
must file a beneficial ownership statement containing the information
required by Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G. 96 Rule 13d-3 under the
Exchange Act provides the definition of beneficial ownership.97 Within its
broad definition are those with the power to vote or dispose of any equity
securities or the power to direct the voting or disposition of those
securities. 98 Hedge funds and hedge fund managers who exercise power
over equity securities held by the fund may be deemed by the rule to own
the equity securities owned by the hedge fund.99
Under limited
circumstances, hedge funds and their advisors may opt to file a short form,
Schedule 13G, in lieu of filing the longer Schedule 13D.100
Schedule 13D also requires disclosure of certain other material
information regarding the reporting person and the acquisition of the
securities.'°' Upon being subjected to the reporting obligations of Section
13(d) or 13(g), any previously submitted beneficial ownership statements
10 2
must be amended if certain information in statements changes.
Additionally, hedge fund advisers may be required to provide quarterly
updates as required by Section 13(f) of the Act. 03 Section 13(f) applies to
any "institutional investment manager" who exercises investment discretion
with respect to accounts having an aggregate fair market value of at least
92 Id. § 781(g).

93Id. §
94 Id.

78m.

9' 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
96 Id. §§ 78m(d), (e).
97 17

C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2006).
98 See id.
99See id.
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1).
"' 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5.
102See id. § 240.13d-2.
103 Id. § 240.13f.
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$100 million in equity securities. 104 An "institutional investment manager"
includes any person (other than a natural person) investing in or buying and
selling securities for its own account, and any person exercising investment
discretion with respect to the account of any other person.10 5 Section 16
applies to every person who is the beneficial owner of more than ten
percent of any class of equity security registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act and each officer and director of the issuer of the security
(collectively, "reporting persons" or "insiders"). 10 6 Upon becoming a
reporting person, a person is required by Section 16(a) to file an initial
report with the SEC disclosing the amount of his or her beneficial
ownership of all equity securities of the issuer.10 7 Section 16(a) also
requires reporting persons to keep this information current by reporting to
the SEC changes in ownership of these equity securities, or the purchase or
sale of security-based swap agreements involving these securities. 108 Hedge
funds are also subject to the short swing profit provisions of Section 16(b)
of the Exchange Act.1 09
3. Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act")
regulates investment companies' activities and transactions and requires
them to register with the SEC. 10 Hedge funds rely on one of two
exclusions under the Investment Company Act to avoid having to be
subjected to registration and regulation, Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7).
Section 3(c)(1) excludes "[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities
(other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one
hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to
make a public offering of its securities" from the definition of "investment
company" under the act." 1 However, the exclusion places limitations on
the hedge fund to purchase or acquire any security issued by any registered
investment company and the sale of any security issued by any registered
open-end investment company to any such issuer. Generally, corporate
investors count as one investor when evaluating compliance with the 100investor limitation. Section 3(c)(1) reflects Congress's view that privately
placed investment companies owned by a limited number of investors do
not rise to the level of federal interest under the Investment Company Act.
104

id.

105 Id.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (1994).
78p(a).
108 Id.

106

107 Id. §

109

Id. § 78p(b).

11o See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a- 1-80a-64 (1994).
...
Id. § 80a-3(c)(1).
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Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act excludes from the
definition of investment company "any issuer, the outstanding securities of
which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of
such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does
'1 12
not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities."
Congress's rationale for this exclusion was its belief that certain highly
sophisticated investors do not need the protections of the Investment
Company Act because those investors are in a position to appreciate the
risks associated with pooled investment vehicles. Although a hedge fund
relying on Section 3(c)(7) may accept an unlimited number of qualified
purchasers for investment in the fund, as a practical matter, most funds have
no more than 499 investors to avoid the registration and reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act.
Unlike Section 3(c)(1), Section 3(c)(7) does not have a "look-through"
provision in the event that a registered investment company or a private
investment company owns ten percent or more of the Section 3(c)(7) fund's
outstanding voting securities. A hedge fund using the section 3(c)(7)
exemption "is only required to look through any company (investment
company or otherwise) that invests in its shares to determine whether that
company's investors are qualified purchasers' 13if the company was 'formed
for the purpose' of investing in the ... fund."'
4. Investment Advisers Act of 1940

Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Investment Advisers
Act"), investment advisers must register with the SEC and comply with the
provisions of the Act, including any SEC rules.114 Registered investment
advisers are required (1) to keep a current Form ADVE 5 on file with the
Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A).
supra note 8, at 13.
114 See generally Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l-80b-21 (1994).
115The SEC's website explains the Form ADV requirements.
112

113SEC REPORT,

Advisers use Form ADV to register as an investment adviser with the SEC.
Generally, an investment adviser that manages $25 million or more in client assets
must register with the SEC. Advisers that manage less than $25 million must
register with the state securities regulator where the adviser's principal place of
business is located. Form ADV also is used for state registration. Form ADV has
two parts. Part I contains information about the adviser's education, business, and
an adviser's disciplinary history within the last ten years. Part I is filed
electronically with the SEC. Part II includes information on an adviser's services,
fees, and investment strategies. The SEC does not require advisers to file Part I1
electronically.
SEC Website, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
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SEC and (2) to provide a disclosure statement to their clients. 16 The
purpose of the disclosures is to provide both the SEC and the adviser's
investors with current information about the adviser, such as the business
practices. Registered advisers are required to maintain books and records
and to submit to periodic examinations by the SEC staff.'17
Most hedge fund advisers have avoided having to register with the
SEC by relying on the de minimis exemption. Section 203(b) of the
Investment Advisers Act excludes "any investment adviser who during the
course of the preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients
and who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment
adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company
registered. ...
." 18 Section 203(b) permits advisers to count a "legal
organization," such as a hedge fund, as a single client.'" 9 Therefore, as long
as they satisfy the "no holding out" condition, advisers may manage up to
14 funds before they are required to register with the Commission as an
investment adviser.' 0
B. SEC's Staff Conducts Study of Hedge Funds
In June 2002, the SEC's staff undertook a study of the operations and
practices of the hedge funds in large part due to the increase in hedge fund
enforcement cases, the greater role of hedge funds in the financial markets,
and the agency's lack of basic information on hedge funds. 12 At the same
time that the SEC's staff members were conducting their study, they
organized a roundtable on hedge funds with industry representatives and
other interested persons, and requested comments from the public on issues
dealing with hedge funds.122 As a result of the staff's study, the roundtable,
a report to the SEC with
and the comments it received, the staff submitted
23
preliminary findings and recommendations.1
The preliminary report outlined four major areas of concern for the
SEC in regard to hedge fund activity. First, as hedge funds become more
and more important participants in the financial markets and important
investment vehicles for large institutions, the SEC is concerned that its lack
of direct information on hedge funds and their activities hampers its ability
to develop effective regulatory policy. 24 The SEC is concerned that its
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1).
Id. § 80b-3(c).
118 Id. § 80b-3(b)(3).
19 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(2)(i).
120 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
121See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at vii-viii.
116
117

122 Id. at viii.
123 id.
124 Id. at x.
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inability to examine hedge funds essentially places it in a position of having
to wait and see if fraud or misconduct develops.1 25 Only when third parties
report such conduct is the SEC able to take action. Usually, by then,
investors (or whatever the appropriate party is) have suffered substantial
losses.
Second, the SEC is concerned that investors in a hedge fund "may not
always receive useful information about the investment adviser and its
management of the fund., 126 The SEC also believes that disclosure to
hedge fund investors could help "address conflicts of interests of hedge
fund advisors." 127 The SEC feels that there should be some regulatory
that
measures that help ensure that investors receive material information
128
will help them make "fully informed investment decisions."'
A third concern of the SEC is the way that hedge funds' managers
value their hedge funds' assets. According to the SEC, this "broad
discretion that [hedge fund] advisers have to value assets and the lack of
independent review over that activity gives rise to questions about whether
some hedge funds' portfolio holdings are accurately valued.' ' 29 Finally, the
SEC is concerned about the proliferation of hedge 30funds that essentially
advertise their investment funds through the internet.1
C. The SEC Staffs Recommendations
To address these concerns, the SEC's staff made several
recommendations to the Commission. The first was that the SEC should
consider revising its rules under the Investment Advisers Act to require
advisers of hedge funds to register as investment advisers.' 3 1 According to
the SEC staff, revising the rules would "require hedge fund advisers to
'look through' any hedge fund under their management and count each
investor in each hedge fund as a separate client of the adviser."' 312 The
effect of this would require most large hedge funds to register. 33 In
addition, the SEC's staff recommended that the SEC consider changing its
rules "to require that registered hedge fund advisers file with the
statement specifically
Commission, and deliver to investors,
' 34 a disclosure
designed for hedge fund investors."'
125 Id.
126

Id. at xi.

127 SEC
128

REPORT,

supra note 8, at xi.

Id. at x.

129Id. at xi.

130 Id.
'3'Id. at xi-xii.
132 Id. at xi-xii.

133 SEC
134

id.

REPORT,

supra note 8, at xi-xii.
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The SEC's staff saw several benefits to requiring registration. First,
"registered hedge fund advisers would become subject to the Commission's
regular inspections and examinations program."13 This would result in a
more effective SEC oversight of the hedge funds and would likely lead to
"earlier detection of actual and potential misconduct, help to deter fraud and
encourage a culture of compliance and controls.', 136 Second, the SEC
would be authorized to "collect basic and meaningful information about the
activities of hedge fund advisers and hedge funds, which are becoming
increasingly influential participants in the U.S. financial markets."' 137 Third,
required registration would allow the SEC to require hedge fund advisers to
disclose information important to investors. 138 Fourth, required registration
would "effectively increase the minimum investment requirement for direct
investments in certain hedge funds because registered advisers are generally
prohibited from charging performance fees unless investors have
139 $750,000
invested with the adviser or have a net worth of $1.5 million."'
According to the SEC staff, required registration would not adversely
affect the way hedge fund advisers operate their hedge funds. 140 Required
registration would not restrict hedge funds' ability "to trade securities, use
leverage, sell securities short or enter into derivative transactions."' 141 The
proposed registration requirement would not require hedge fund advisors to
disclose proprietary trading strategies or portfolio positions. 42 Registration
also would not result in hedge funds having
to identify their investors or
143
inadvertently identifying their investors.
The SEC staff also recommended that the Commission:
Consider requiring, through rulemaking, that all registered
investment companies that invest their assets in hedge funds,
including registered FOHFs, 144 have policies and procedures
designed to ensure that funds and their boards value their interests in
hedge funds in a manner 45consistent with the requirements of the
Investment Company Act. 1

135 Id.
136 Id.at

xi.

137Id.
138 Id.

139SEC

REPORT,

supra note 8, at xi.

140Id.
141Id.
142Id.

143Id.
144A Fund of Hedge Funds ("FOHF") is an investment fund that invests in multiple

hedge funds rather investing in individual securities.
145 SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at xii.
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Finally, the SEC's staff report recommended that the Commission consider
eliminating the prohibition on hedge funds' general solicitation of
advertising of their offerings because of the requirement that hedge funds'
investors be sophisticated investors. 46 The SEC believed that allowing
hedge funds, which already limit their investors to a higher standard of
sophistication, to solicit, would not raise significant investor protection
concerns and would help with
47 capital formation for hedge funds and other
pooled investment vehicles. 1
D. The SEC's Adoption of the Final Rule
The SEC received over 160 comments from a range of interested
parties, including hedge fund advisers, investors, trade associations, and law
firms. Most commentators supported additional oversight by the SEC.
Others were strongly opposed to additional oversight, including the two
SEC commissioners who voted against the
148 proposed rule, Commissioners
Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins.
An additional concern cited by the SEC's staff in the Final Rule was
the recent increase in investment in hedge funds by public and private
pension funds, college and university endowments, foundations, and other
charitable organizations. 149 As these entities invest more of their assets in
hedge funds, they are exposed to the risks of hedge fund investing. If they
suffer losses from their hedge fund investments, it may significantly impact
their ability to satisfy their obligation to their beneficiaries. 50 The rule and
rule amendments were designed to provide the protections afforded by the
Advisers Act to investors in hedge funds, and to enhance the Commission's
ability to protect our nation's securities markets.
Recent changes by the SEC have made avoiding regulation more
difficult for hedge funds. The SEC Final Rule created Rule 203(b)-2 to
146

147

Id. at xii.
Id.

Commissioners Glassman and Atkins stated several reasons for their dissent. They
view mandatory registration as an inappropriate response to the Commission's concerns
related to hedge funds, including that: (1) the growth of hedge funds alone is not a reason
alone to justify registration, (2) "registration is not likely to deter or lessen substantially the
harm of fraudulent activities of the type cited by the majority," and (3) no evidence
corroborates the majority's opinion that retailization of hedge funds is a problem and even
more importantly that mandatory registration would be the appropriate remedy. SEC Final
Rule, supra note 48, at 72089-98. Furthermore, Commissioners Glassman and Atkins
believe neither that the stated reasons for requiring registration justify imposing substantial
costs on hedge funds nor that these reasons justify diverting precious SEC resources to
regulating hedge funds. Id. at 72098. Commissioners Glassman and Atkins also believe the
majority "failed to draw legitimate distinctions between hedge funds and other types of
private investment pools that would justify different regulatory schemes." Id.
149 Id. at 72057-58.
0 Id. at 72058.
148
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"close the loophole" by which hedge funds could escape registering under
the Investment Advisers Act. Rule 203(b)-2 "requires investment advisers
to count each owner of a 'private fund' towards the threshold of fourteen
clients for purposes of determining the availability of the private adviser
exemption of section 203(b)(3) of the Act."'' Thus, an adviser to a private
fund "can no longer rely on the private adviser exemption if the adviser,
during the course of the preceding twelve months, has advised private funds
that had more than fourteen investors."'' 52 Furthermore, "an adviser that
advises individual clients directly must count those clients together with the
investors in any private fund it advises in determining its total number of
clients for purposes of section 203(b)(3)."' 15 3 "If the total number of
individual clients and investors in private funds exceeds fourteen, the
adviser is not eligible for the private adviser exemption and must register
with [the SEC], assuming it154meets [the SEC's] minimum requirements for
assets under management."
The SEC defines a "private fund" in regard to three characteristics that
are "shared by virtually all hedge funds, and that differentiate hedge funds
from other pooled investment vehicles such as private equity funds or
venture capital funds."' 155 First, an investment company is a private fund if
it would be subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act but for
156
its use of one of two exceptions under sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7).
Second, an investment company is a private fund if it permits investors 5to
redeem their interests in the fund within two years of acquiring them. 1
Finally, an investment company is a private fund "only if interests in it are
offered based on the investment advisory skills, ability or expertise of the
investment adviser."' 58 The SEC amended Rule 203(b)(3)-l to clarify
further that "investment advisers
may not count hedge funds as single
59
clients under the safe harbor."'1
Since the adoption of the Final Rule requiring hedge funds to register
with the agency, several hedge funds and hedge fund managers have sued
the SEC over the SEC's rule changes. 160 In addition, some hedge funds
151 Id.
152 Id.
153

Id.
154 SEC Final Rule, supra note 48, at 72070.
155

156

Id. at 72073.
Id. at 72068.

7 Id. at 72074.

Id. at 72075.
159 Id.
158

160

On December 21, 2004, Phillip Goldstein, President of Kimball & Winthrop, a hedge

fund advisory company, and other interested parties sued the SEC in federal court, arguing
that by adopting the hedge fund rule requiring "advisers to private investment entities known
as hedge funds to register under the Advisers Act," the SEC seeks to do "what Congress has
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have sought to avoid registering under the new rule by changing their lockup period, so that the amount of time investors' investments are locked into
the fund exceeds the two year period
after which the SEC considers an
161
investment fund to be a hedge fund.
The SEC's recent change to the Investment Advisers Act is a step in
the right direction. However, the SEC needs to go further to include capital
requirements and limits on leverage.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY'S
REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
In August 2002, the FSA issued a discussion paper ("2002 DP")
detailing the British regulator's regulatory approach to hedge funds and
hedge fund managers. 16
The FSA sought comment on its existing
regulatory approach to selling and marketing of hedge funds in the United
Kingdom.'16 The FSA also sought comment on its regulation of U.K.-based
fund managers who manage offshore hedge funds and its approach to
monitoring the effects of hedge funds on U.K. markets from parties

precluded the Commission from doing-regulate private investment entities and advisers
that Congress has expressly exempted from regulation under the Investment Company Act
and the Advisers Act." Opening Brief for Petitioners, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434, 2005
WL 1666937, at *8 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2005). The plaintiffs asked the court to vacate the
Hedge Fund Rule "because it is contrary to the clearly expressed intentions of Congress."
Id. at *2. In response, the SEC argued that the plaintiffs' challenges to the Final Rule and
rule amendments "have no merit." Brief of the SEC, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434, 2005
WL 1636146, at *5 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2005). According to the SEC, the plaintiffs
"erroneously rely ... on unwarranted inferences drawn from the exemptive provisions of a
different statute, the Investment Company Act, and on a Supreme Court case, Lowe v. SEC,
472 U.S. 181 (1985), which involved a different provision of the Advisers Act not at issue
here." Id. at *5-*6. The SEC argues that "under well-settled principles of statutory
construction and administrative law" it has "the authority to interpret an ambiguous statutory
provision," and its "reasonable interpretation of this provision is entitled to deference." Id. at
*6. The D.C. Circuit recently issued a decision in the case. The court found that the hedge
fund rule requiring investors in a hedge fund to be counted as clients of the fund for the
purpose of determining whether the fund meets the fewer-than-fifteen clients exemption to
conflict with the purpose of the underlying statute, and that the rule was arbitrary. Goldstein
v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Although the courts have overruled the SEC, this
setback may be only temporary: the SEC may now either (1) revise its registration
requirements to meet the court's opinion or (2) ask Congress to empower it to impose the
Hedge Fund rule. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit's decision does not impact the aim of this
comment, which is that the most important issue that the SEC should focus on is not investor
protection but the risk associated with hedge fund activities to the global financial markets.
161 See, e.g., Locked Up: Hedge Funds Tie Up Investor Money for Longer, AFX NEWS
LIMITED (London), Aug. 17, 2005.
162See generally FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, HEDGE FUNDS AND THE FSA (Aug.
2002), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpl6.pdf [hereinafter 2002 DP].
163 See id. at 3-5.
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connected to the hedge fund industry.' 64 At that time, the FSA was
considering relaxing its rules against the marketing and selling of hedge
investment products
funds to the general U.K. public to make hedge fund
165
more readily accessible to the U.K. general public.
The FSA considered the "small scale of operations of most hedge fund
managers, and the lack of impact on retail consumers," to mean that most
hedge funds had a low impact on the financial markets and thus did not
jeopardize the FSA's ability to meet its regulatory objectives.' 66 In
addition, the FSA felt that offshore hedge funds that use U.K.-authorized
hedge fund managers did not fall within the Financial Services and Markets
Act, which provides FSA with its regulatory authority, and therefore the
FSA had no authority over the hedge funds themselves. 167 Furthermore,
because most hedge funds with U.K. hedge fund managers are located
offshore, the FSA indicated that it did not use any of its resources to
maintain an active supervision over most hedge fund managers. 168
In the 2002 DP, the FSA stated that it did not formally prohibit the
marketing of hedge fund products to consumers as long as hedge funds
abided by certain regulations. 69 The FSA indicated that only regulated
investment funds sold by "authorised persons" are allowed to be marketed
to the general U.K. public. 70 To market to the general public in the United
Kingdom, hedge funds have to follow the "collective investment scheme"
requirements; important requirements of the scheme include (1) that the
funds are authorized by the FSA and (2) that authorized funds report
"particulars" of their investment scheme, 71 something that most hedge
strategies.
funds are opposed to doing for fear of giving away proprietary
172
authorization.
sought
not
have
funds
hedge
most
Thus,
Besides seeking authorization from the FSA directly, there are a few
other ways that a U.K. investor can invest in hedge funds. One is for the
U.K. investor to deal directly with an offshore hedge fund.173 In this case,
the investor has to seek out hedge fund investments on his or her own
accord. By investing in the offshore hedge fund, the investor loses any
id.
Id.
166Id. at 4.
164

165

167 Id.

1682002 DP, supra note 162, at 4.
169 Id. at 12.
170 Id. at 13.
171See id. at 26-27.
172Under the current U.K. regulations,

"hedge

fund managers typically

require

authorisation under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) because they carry on
the activities that are specified by article 37 (Managing Investments) or article 53 (Advising
on Investments) of the Regulated Activities Order." 2005 DP, supra note 3, at 16.
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protection available under U.K. laws governing financial products. Another
option available would be for the investor to invest through an
intermediary.1 74 A regulated firm could "opt up" an investor as long as the
regulated firm takes reasonable care to determine that the investor client has
"enough expertise and understanding" to be considered an intermediate
customer. 175 This is similar to the requirement in the United States which
allows hedge funds to be sold to "qualified investors."' 176 U.K. regulations
require that the intermediary also "give a written warning to the customers
of the protections forgone by the opt-up, such as access to U.K.
compensation arrangements," and "either get the investor's written consent
or be otherwise able to show that informed consent" was given by the
investor. 177 The FSA also makes it possible for an intermediary to provide
advice on hedge funds to a potential investor if the customer approaches the
intermediary and asks about investing specifically in hedge funds or if the
regulated firm/intermediary takes reasonable steps to make sure that the
particular hedge fund is appropriate for
the investor. 178 A third option for a
79
FOHF.
a
in
invest
to
is
U.K. investor
Following the release of the 2002 DP, the FSA requested responses
from hedge funds and other interested parties on a series of questions, such
as whether (1) there was a strong case for the FSA to change its regulatory
approach to hedge fund marketing and selling to sophisticated investors, (2)
hedge funds are suitable financial products that should be marketed and
sold to retail investors, and (3) the FSA should change its regulatory
approach to hedge fund managers. 18° In March 2003, the FSA published
those responses and announced its decision not to change its current
regulatory approach to hedge funds.' 81
The recent rise in hedge fund activity on a global scale and hedge fund
fraud in the United States has prompted the FSA once again to examine its
approach to regulating hedge funds. According to the FSA, investors,
market participants, commentators, and regulators have indicated that hedge
funds are becoming more important to the FSA.182 Furthermore, the recent
growth of hedge funds has83 significantly increased hedge funds' role in
providing market liquidity.'
14

Id. at 14.

17 Id.
176 15

U.S.C. § 78c(a)(54) (1994).

1772002 DP, supra note 162, at 14.
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180 Id.at 23.
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Responding to those concerns, the FSA published its 2005 Discussion
Paper ("2005 DP"). The FSA's overarching goals for publishing its 2005
DP are to clarify the FSA's current assessment of the risks posed by hedge
funds to the regulator's objectives and to seek input from hedge funds,
investors, and other important stakeholders on whether the FSA should
change its current approach to regulating hedge funds.18 4 Specifically, the
FSA wanted feedback on whether it should distinguish hedge fund
managers from other investment managers because hedge fund managers
associated with their activities than other
have significantly more
85 risk
investment managers.1
If the FSA distinguishes hedge fund managers from other investment
managers, it proposes that any distinction be made based on the investment
technique of hedge funds rather than the legal structure.1 86 The FSA prefers
to focus on the distinction in risk and discourage hedge funds from seeking
ways to evade any distinctions that are made based on a particular legal
structure.1 87 Thus, it would appear that under such a proposal hedge fund
managers who use investment techniques as defined by the FSA could be
subject to FSA oversight, regardless of whether they operate within a legal
structure that is entirely located within the United Kingdom, or a legal
structure that that involves the use of U.K.-based advisers where the
majority of the hedge funds activities are located offshore.
Some of the risks and concerns considered by the FSA include market
disruption and erosion of investor confidence, liquidity disruption leading
to disorderly markets, insufficient information to inform regulatory action,
control issues, operation risk, risk management, valuation weaknesses,
market abuse, fraud, money laundering, conflicts of interest, and
insufficient information for investors to make informed comparisons
between hedge funds.1 88 The FSA has also taken the immediate step of
establishing a center of hedge fund expertise within its Wholesale Markets
Business to strengthen its oversight over the "high impact" hedge funds.1 89
Additionally, the FSA sought feedback from interested parties on whether it
should consider distinguishing prime brokers, including new prime brokers
who might not follow standard risk management procedures in order to gain
market share, and whether it should collect additional data from hedge fund
of high impact
managers to support its "enhanced supervisory oversight
90
firms and the accurate targeting of thematic review."'
Id.
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184

186

Id. at 39-40.

187

Id.

188 2005 DP, supra note 3, at 6-7.
189 Id. at 41.
19 Id.at 9.

Hedge Fund Regulation
27:497 (2007)

I will focus my discussion going forward on the FSA's concerns about
market disruption and erosion of investor confidence, liquidity disruption
leading to disorderly markets, insufficient information to inform regulatory
action, risk management, and some industry participants' comment letters.
A. Market Disruption and Erosion of Investor Confidence
The FSA feels, and I agree, that the significant risk of massive
financial instability to the overall market might occur-risk that hedge
funds do not internalize when making their investment decisions or are
more willing to accept than they should be willing to accept.1 91 For
example, if a few large hedge funds or collection of medium hedge funds
were to suffer extraordinary distress, their distress would likely affect not
only those funds 192 but also the global financial markets through the hedge
funds' effect on their counterparties and investor confidence in the markets,
and therefore the markets themselves. Although it is less likely that a single
hedge fund will have the same effect that LTCM had on the global financial
markets now or in the future, it is possible that a group of large hedge
funds, all pursuing the same investment strategies because of the dearth of
investment opportunities, might have an even greater effect on the global
financial markets if they were forced by some unanticipated event to sell
their positions or all suffered massive losses from the exposure to the same
positions. The recent increase in investments in FOHFs exacerbates the
problem because most of these funds are leveraged and they are investing in
funds that are also leveraged. Thus, instead of lowering risk they magnify
it. For example, the failure of one hedge fund may impact the FOHF's
leverage position and may force it to sell and accept massive losses. It is
impossible to estimate the extent of risk from hedge funds, FOHF market
positions and leverage because most of the information is not available.
B. Insufficient Information to Inform Regulatory Action
The FSA is considering enhancing its data collection from hedge funds
' 93
in order to identify "significant changes to a firm's impact over time."'
The FSA believes increasing its awareness of major trends in the hedge
fund field will allow it to respond more effectively to any crisis. 1 9 4 Unlike
the SEC, the FSA is not as focused on requiring hedge funds to disclose
certain financial or operational data to investors. The FSA correctly feels
that its role as regulator is neither to facilitate "zero failure" of hedge funds
91

See id. at 18-22.
is assumed that investors accept the risk of losing of their investment but the risk

192 It

placed on the market by hedge funds are not included in the hedge fund's assessment of its
activity.
1932005 DP,supra note 3, at 44.
194id.
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95
nor to "guarantee the financial soundness or profitability" of hedge funds.,
The onus is on the investors to make sure that they received whatever
information they deem necessary in monitoring their investment. If
investors are unhappy with the hedge fund's performance or levels of fund
exposure, they can withdraw their capital.
The FSA has also created a "center of hedge fund" expertise to
enhance supervision over the fifteen to twenty five hedge fund managers
who have the largest market impact. 96 The center is responsible for
"relationship management of high-impact hedge fund managers, driving
relevant thematic work and supporting authorization, enforcement and

policy initiatives that [can] benefit from such expertise."'

97

Hedge fund

managers that pose little risk to the FSA's objectives would not face
significant additional supervision.
C. Liquidity Disruption Leading to Disorderly Markets
The FSA is concerned that liquidity disruptions could cause disorder in
the financial markets. One trend cited by the FSA is the search by hedge
funds for investment opportunities with higher returns which has led some
to move into "complex assets where liquidity may not be as great as that
found in more traditional markets."' 198 This is a problem because the
potential for liquidity disruption is increased as hedge funds move into
more illiquid investments. An additional concern was that hedge funds
concentrations into similar markets may exacerbate liquidity problems if all
hedge funds attempt to exit positions or markets at the same time. 99
The FSA is also alarmed by hedge funds' leverage and its effect on
liquidity risk. According to the FSA, "any hedge fund that is leveraged
faces the risk of an increase in financing costs/margin payments or the
cutting of credit lines., 200 This effect of leverage on liquidity risks may rise
with the introduction of more risky debt products, such as cross
margining.2 0' Additionally, the FSA is concerned about liquidity
mismatches between hedge fund investments and their investors. The FSA
believes that "substantial redemptions may make [hedge funds] become
forced sellers. 20 2 Liquidity risk from investors' early redemptions may be
growing as hedge funds rely more on large institutional investors.
The FSA received several comment letters from interested parties,
195 Id. at 46.
196 Id. at 41.
197 Id.
198 Id. at

30.

199 2005 DP, supra note 3, at 30.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 31.
202
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including the Managed Fund Association ("MFA"), 203 the Investment
Management Association ("IMA"), 202054 and the Alternative Investment
Management Association ("AIMA").
D. MFA's Comment Letter
The MFA agrees that, given the rapid growth and profile of hedge
funds and their anticipated growth, the FSA should review its regulatory
approach to hedge funds and reassess the risks associated with hedge fund
activity. But the MFA believes that the growth and profile of hedge funds
does not in itself justify any change.2 °6 The MFA argues that "the current
level and method of regulation is appropriate. 20 7 The MFA also agrees that
the FSA should avoid encouraging more of the hedge fund industry to move
offshore or seek "regulatory arbitrage. 20 8 The FSA argues that although
the risks identified by the FSA are "broadly correct," the risks identified are
not "specific to the hedge fund industry, but rather to financial services as a
whole., 20 9 The MFA is another proponent of "industry-led initiatives," or
self-policing, to deal with the FSA's and the public's concerns about hedge
funds. 2 10 The MFA believes that "industry-led initiatives are the best way
to achieve high standards in the industry," citing its own work in the area of
promoting sound business practices within the hedge fund industry as an
21!
example of such an industry-led initiative.
Responding to the FSA proposal to distinguish hedge fund managers
from other investment managers, the MFA contends that treating hedge
203 The MFA has over 1,000 members in the alternative investment industry, including
hedge funds and FOHFs. A significant portion of the hedge fund industry is a part of MFA.
See Managed Fund Association Comment Letter (Oct. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.mfainfo.org/images/PDF/MFAFSALetter. I0.28.05.pdf
[hereinafter
MFA
Comment].
204 The IMA represents the U.K.-based investment management industry. Its members
include "independent fund managers, the asset management arms of retail banks, life
insurers and investment banks." Many of its members offer hedge fund products. See
Investment Management Association Comment Letter (Oct. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.investmentuk.org/news/research/2005/recipient/fsa/fsa- 1005.pdf
[hereinafter
IMA Comment].
205 The AlMA represents professionals who are involved in all aspects of the alternative

investment management industry, including hedge fund manager. See Alternative Investment
Management
Association Comment Letter (Oct. 28,
http://www.aima.org/uploads/AIMAResponsetoDPO5.4-270ct.pdf

Comment].
206 MFA Comment, supra note 203, at 2.
207

Id.

208 Id.
209

Id. at 3.

210 Id.
211

Id. at 3-4.

2005), available at
[hereinafter
AlMA

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

27:497 (2007)

funds as a general class is difficult because of variations in strategy, size,
and organizational structures.
It argues that "one size does not fit all"
with regard to hedge funds, and that this makes it hard to develop a
statutory definition to distinguish hedge funds from other investment
funds. 2 3 The MFA is encouraging the FSA to use "guiding principles" to
distinguish hedge funds managers' funds from those of other investment
managers. 214 Some of the guiding principles include distinguishing hedge
funds on (1) "the net worth [and] sophisticated nature of investors," (2)
"'absolute return' strategies that are not tied to a benchmark such as the...
S&P 500," and (3) "active management, rather than traditional 'buy and
hold,' strategies that utilize a range of investment products. 2 15 The MFA
believes that "a rigid definition" may216
allow hedge funds to circumvent the
definition by restructuring to evade it.
The MFA agrees with the FSA that "the probability of an event
significantly affecting the financial stability of the United Kingdom is
relatively low. 217 The MFA also agrees that "robust risk management is
essential within the hedge fund sector. ', 218 However, the MFA believes that
the onus should be on hedge fund managers to mitigate the potential risk of
,,2 19
"liquidity mismatches"
by employing strong "risk control" and "liquidity
management.
To manage market risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk, the
MFA recommends that hedge fund managers establish a "risk monitoring
function, which may be a hedge fund employee or a team of employees that
is responsible for measuring and tracking the risk assumed" by the hedge
fund. 2 0 The MFA believes that the hedge fund industry has made strides in
managing market risk, which the MFA feels provides evidence that an
"industry-led initiative"
is the "best way to achieve high standards in a
22 1
global industry.,
The MFA made several additional recommendations to address
liquidity risk, such as managers' "evaluat[ing] their cash and borrowing
capacity under the worst historical draw down and stressed market
conditions, and taking into account potential investor redemptions and
contractual arrangements that affect liquidity. 2 22
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The MFA finds "problematic" the FSA's consideration of imposing
additional data requirements on hedge funds.223 According to the MFA,
there is no single process by which hedge funds process data internally, and
even if there were an easy way to download the data to the FSA, "there
would be no consistency in [the] method of preparation or presentation"
such that "any meaningful analysis could be carried out. 224 The MFA feels
strongly that requiring hedge fund managers to prepare additional reports
will add "a significant compliance burden" without necessarily adding
value to hedge fund supervision.22 5
E. IMA's Comment Letter
In its comment letter, the IMA commends the FSA on its "thorough
job" identifying the main areas of concern regarding the impact of hedge
funds on global financial markets.2 26 The IMA agrees that a "further,
targeted regulatory involvement in monitoring hedge fund impact on
markets may be beneficial" and also agrees with the "FSA's assessment of
the risk posed to markets. 22 7 However, the IMA does not agree that the
FSA should "pull hedge fund managers further into the regulatory net"
because this would not bring actual hedge funds within the FSA's
jurisdiction. 8 Instead, the IMA feels that the FSA should enhance its
supervision of prime brokers because they are within the FSA's
jurisdiction. 229 But before further regulating prime brokers 23 ° or any other
market participant, the IMA feels that the FSA should do an "economic
analysis of the case for regulation. 23 1 The IMA advocates that the FSA
"establish better the real impact of the risks [the FSA] has identified, and
whether these could be considered systemic. 2 32 The IMA believes the FSA
should take into consideration "the extent to which the market offers its
own correcti[on]. 233
The IMA believes prime brokers would be the best group for the FSA
to target for regulatory reform because prime brokers are (1) within the
223
224

Id. at 13.
MFA Comment, supra note 203, at 13.

225 Id.

226 IMA Comment, supra note 204, at 1.
227 Id.
228 Id.

Id. at 2.
Prime brokers help facilitate the clearance and settlement of securities trades and
provide other services to large retail and institutional clients such as hedge funds. See SEC
REPORT, supra note 8, at 5355 (describing prime brokers and the services they offer to hedge
funds).
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FSA's regulatory reach and (2) "the single most important link to the
markets for the [hedge] funds ....
According to the IMA, without
prime brokers, hedge funds cannot function.23 5 The IMA does not believe
that the FSA should target reform through hedge fund managers because the
FSA has clear jurisdiction over those funds located within the United
Kingdom, but not those located outside of United Kingdom.23 6 The IMA
argues that with regard to these latter funds, the FSA "has no jurisdiction to
inquire into the fund" and more specifically, the FSA cannot "investigate
whether the fund is doing what it says its doing and whether its governance
is robust. 237 Although the hedge fund's managers manage the fund's
assets, the IMA argues that the management of the fund's assets does not
legally give the hedge fund managers control over the governance of the
fund.38 According to the IMA, usually the "fund's governance operates
through several channels in addition to the [hedge fund manager], such as
through its Board of trustees and through its administrator and
custodian., 239 The IMA argues that the FSA would need to have "oversight
of all these functions to be able to ensure that the fund was operating as it
should., 240
Finally, the IMA says that "regulating the [hedge fund]
manager in his relationship with the fund does not offer a feasible substitute
for oversight of the fund's operations." 24'
The IMA similarly does not believe that the risks identified by the
FSA are unique to hedge funds.242 The IMA believes the only identified
risk that warrants additional regulatory oversight is the "identification of
(potential) systemic risk in the markets that cannot be mitigated by market
users." 243 The IMA argues that "systemic risk" is likely to emerge from
prime brokers' activities to the extent that the risk that primer brokers face
is "so catastrophic that it impairs their ability to do business elsewhere and
thus squeezes available liquidity in the market. The risk, in other words, is
of over concentration of intermediary liquidity in a particular
market"...,,244 Furthermore, the IMA argues that the FSA is "best able to
protect markets through enforcing standards of behaviour on market
operators and on intermediaries., 245 The IMA believes the same does not
234
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hold true for market users. In its words, "the best guard against systemic
failure, and against adverse market impact, is to ensure that the
intermediary firms are thorough in their dealings with hedge funds, and that
all aspects of the relationship are managed and tested. 246
F. AIMA's Comment Letter
The AlMA states that the FSA has offered "no evidence to suggest that
hedge fund managers are likely to cause any more disruption to the market
than other players." 247 The ALMA argues that other than the LTCM's near
collapse in 1998, "in other times where hedge funds suffered losses, major
redemptions and even closure ... there was no substantial disruption to the

market and very limited investor 'pain,' which was absorbed by the market
without regulator intervention., 248 The AIMA states that although recently
hedge funds have closed due to poor performance, "in a free market, this is
not a sign of ill-health in the market as a whole.

2 49

The AlMA believes that the distinction between hedge fund managers
and other investment managers is "blurring., 250 According to the ALMA,
many hedge funds are now "running long-only funds.
This calls into
question whether the FSA should attempt to distinguish hedge fund
managers from other investment managers. The AIMA is very troubled
that the decision to distinguish certain hedge funds based on particular
investment strategies would allow managers who do not fit any established
criteria, but who propose equal or greater risks, to escape scrutiny. 252
The AlMA also advocates that "any initiative to raise standards should
be regulator-rather than industry-led. 2 53 On the issue of whether the
FSA should make hedge fund managers seek permission before engaging in
hedge fund type activity, the AIMA believes that notification "is more in
balance with the FSA's intentions and would be more manageable for
managers. 254 The AIMA supports the idea of a new "Center of Expertise"
as long as the center is appropriately staffed with qualified personnel and
sufficient resources.255
The AlMA is not convinced that the FSA will be able to distinguish
between hedge fund managers and the hedge funds themselves and be
246
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within its regulatory authority. 256 The AlMA does not believe the "liquidity
2 57
disruption" or liquidity risks are as significant as the FSA thinks.
According to the AIMA, most hedge funds are taking advantage of
protections available to them to help manage liquidity risk, such as
increasing lock-up periods, "imposition of gates on redemptions, [and]
notice periods for redemptions" which give hedge funds considerable
protections "in the event of a liquidity mismatch. This means that in such
extreme conditions the hedge fund investors will be compelled to remain
fully or partially invested for longer than they might prefer in favour of
achieving
an orderly realisation of positions for redemptions from the hedge
25
fund."

B

Not surprisingly, the members of AIMA who are prime brokers are
against prime brokers' being singled out by the FSA. 259 Also unsurprising
is that members of AlMA who are hedge fund managers advocate that the
260
FSA should focus on prime brokers rather than hedge fund managers.
The hedge fund managers argue that prime brokers pose a risk equal to or
greater than hedge fund managers do "given the nature of [prime brokers']
activities and the variety of the services which they provide., 26 1 According
to hedge fund managers, prime brokers are "central to providing liquidity to
hedge funds... [prime brokers] are the first in line when a credit event
occurs and the positions that they hold and how they deal with them can
determine whether a default escalates out of hand., 262 Interestingly, hedge
fund managers do admit that "introducing new rules for new [prime
brokers] will tend to favor existing [prime brokers] since such a step is
likely to raise barriers to entry. 2 63
VI. CONCLUSION
Hedge funds' impact on the global financial market has grown
substantially in the last decade and is expected to continue to grow. When
hedge funds first emerged as an alternative investment vehicle for
sophisticated investors, it made sense that regulators such as the FSA and
the SEC provided limited regulation to allow them to flourish. During the
initial years, hedge funds had little meaningful affect on the financial
markets and thus were small players. But given hedge funds' impact on the
financial markets today, the SEC and the FSA are correct to change their
Id. at 8.
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regulatory approaches toward hedge funds. However, the SEC needs to go
beyond just the problem of investor fraud. Investor fraud is only part of the
potential problem with the growth of the hedge fund industry, and
registration and disclosure requirements are only part of the solution. The
SEC is overlooking more important concerns: market risk, liquidity risk, the
lack of capital requirements, and excessive economic leverage. The FSA
has yet to determine what changes, in addition to its establishment of a
center on hedge funds, it will make to its regulatory approach to hedge
funds. However, the FSA has focused its inquiry on the right concerns,
market risk, liquidity risk, capital requirements, and limits on economic
leverage, rather than simply on investor fraud and protection.
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